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21 Introduction
Country clubs, academic faculties, social networks as well as internet clubs share one com-
mon characteristic: they are status organizations. The interaction among the members of
these organizations increases the utility for the individual member. The value of interaction
depends on the status of the individual member. The higher the status of an individual
member (e.g. in an academic faculty the ability to publish high-quality research, or in a
country club, the social status) the more valuable this member is for others. Status is a
vertically diﬀerentiable and rival good. The more members interact with members of high
social status, the less valuable this interaction becomes individually. We focus on this wide
range of organizations and study how various decision making rules within the clubs aﬀect
competition among them for new members.
Thereby, our focus is on the development rather than the formation of clubs (the two
main strands of the economics of organizations and clubs).1 We will concentrate on two
main questions. First, what are the main implications of the competition among clubs
regarding the allocation of new members and the distribution of the resulting surplus? Or
to put it more succinctly: will top PhDs join the best or just second tier universities and
for which salaries? Second, what is the impact of alternative decision making regimes and
organizational set-ups (e.g. majority voting, unanimity with or without side payments) on
this and how do they compare in terms of social welfare?
We will show that new candidates with the highest status levels join the club with the
highest average status. New potential candidates with low status levels either join the club
with a low average status or are not accepted by any club at all. Furthermore, we will show
that new entrants with low status levels are unable to appropriate any surplus from joining
the club. In contrast, members with higher status are protected by competition among the
clubs and therefore share the surplus with old club members.
With respect to the diﬀerent decision rules and organizational set-ups we ﬁnd that, under
the unanimity rule, clubs are more reluctant to let new candidates join than under majority
voting, leading to overexclusion of new candidates. In contrast, with meritocracy (i.e. the
club member with the highest status level decides) our analysis predicts overinclusion of new
members. That is, from the point of view of old club members as well as from a welfare
perspective majority voting turns out to be the most eﬃcient decision making rule. This
ﬁnding translates to our main policy implication, that consensus-based clubs such as many
academic faculties in Europe could improve the well-being of their members (and society at
large) if they liberalized their internal decision making processes.
We model competition among clubs for new candidates in a two-club-framework. The
1Henceforth, we will use the terms status organizations and clubs interchangeably. For the sake of clarity,
the term clubs will be used more frequently.
3two clubs with a given number of old club members with given status levels diﬀer in their
average status levels. A high average status club (e.g. Harvard University) competes with a
club with lower average status level (e.g. State University X). Old and new members trade
oﬀ the utility they receive via the average status levels of their companion club members
against the fees they have to pay for covering the costs of the resources necessary to run the
club (the research facilities of the university, the club house of the golf club, the software
platform of the internet club, etc.). The higher the average status of his fellows, the higher
the utility for a club member. Due to the fact that status is a rival good in our model, entry
of a new candidate with a lower than average status leads to a dilution of the status gains for
the old members. This dilution eﬀect can, however, be overcompensated for by the entrance
fee paid by the new candidate.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next session we provide an overview of the
related literature. In section 3 we outline the basic model and look into the competition of
two clubs in the presence of majority voting. In section 4 we characterize the equilibrium in
this set-up. In section 5 we turn to alternative voting schemes, for which we investigate the
emerging allocation after club competition for new candidates. Section 6 is devoted to welfare
implications of the model. In section 7 we discuss robustness of our main assumptions, while
in section 8 we derive testable hypotheses from our analysis and conclude.
2 Related Literature
Our analysis forms part of the existing literature on club formation and competition, whereby
we focus on the latter. The distinguishing feature between most of this large body of litera-
ture and our paper is that the vast majority of papers on club competition has focused on
the idea that (some) clubs can be interpreted as social status organizations in which non-
monetary characteristics of particular club members (which can be ranked vertically) play a
crucial role. Taking this often crucial, but neglected, aspect of clubs into account leads us
to a diﬀerent model and allows us to depict club competition in a completely new manner.
We can identify four diﬀerent branches of literature related to our work. First, one has
to mention the seminal works on the economic theory of clubs which were published in the
1960s. Most notably, Buchanan (1965) and Olson (1965) initiated a major wave of research
on the economic theory of clubs and club goods which was to be further developed in the
decades following. Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) have prepared a survey of the ﬁrst half of
this, while Cornes and Sandler (1996, ch.11) provide an overview of the more recent literature.
Therein, a club good has three major characteristics distinguishing it both from private and
public goods. First of all, clubs are voluntary organizations. Hence, each and every member
has to obtain a net beneﬁt from joining a club. Second, clubs are subject to a congestion
function, i.e. their optimal size is ﬁnite, since a club’s resources are limited. Third, the
4feasibility of clubs depends on the existence of an exclusion mechanism to prevent unlimited
dilution of the club’s resources by unbounded access of new candidates.2 Our paper is in line
with this deﬁnition dealing speciﬁcally with various aspects. As in Ellickson et al. (1999),
we deal with the individual characteristics of new and incumbent club members and the
interrelation of a club’s aggregate characteristics and its competition for new candidates. In
contrast to them, we do not explicitly calculate the optimal size of clubs but equilibrium
levels of admittance fees for one new candidate. Helsley and Strange (1991) too, compare
discriminating pricing schemes, but our paper, furthermore, endogenizes clubs’ governance
structure.3
The second branch of literature we refer to analyzes the optimal size and structure of
political jurisdictions, which could be regarded as clubs on a macroeconomic or political
level. While Bolton and Roland (1997) model the basic trade-oﬀ in terms of the breakup
or uniﬁcation of nations, Casella (2001) focuses on the relationship between jurisdictions
and overall market size. Wacziarg et al. (2003) include growth in their model, which is
empirically tested by Alesina et al. (2004). Casella and Frey (1992) discuss the issue of
overlapping political jurisdictions in a European context. From a formal perspective, these
models either distinguish between individuals horizontally, e.g. concerning preferences, or
vertically, e.g. with regard to income. But in contrast to our analysis, which looks into the
interplay between the change of the social status situation in the club that can be attributed
to new entry and monetary transfer, the interchange between new members and old members
just takes place via monetary transfers.
This is also the main diﬀerence between our model and the third strand of related lit-
erature, which comprises Tiebout models in the strict sense (see e.g. Wildasin (1986) or
Wellisch (2000) for an overview). Those models study the competition of jurisdictions in
the presence of mobile households and/or capital.4 The main policy areas thereby are either
of an allocative nature (public provision of goods) or of a distributive nature (redistribu-
tion among diﬀerent members of a jurisdiction) (see e.g. Pauly (1974)). One part of this
literature analyzes competition for mobile households in a system of jurisdictions (see e.g.
Epple/Sieg (1999), Benabou (1996) and Epple/Romer (2001)). These articles ask for poten-
tial sorting of households along household income. There, however, vertical diﬀerentiation
of households takes place only in income levels. The potential trade oﬀ between vertically
2Therefore, Cornes and Sandler (1996, p.353 and p.347) also call club goods “impure public goods” or
”excludable (rivalrous) public goods”.
3For more details on collective choice schemes, see Zusman (1992).
4The second and third branches of our literature review are somehow interlinked. But whereas the second
branch investigates the question of optimal club size and club formation, the Tiebout type literature is more
concerned with competition of existing jurisdictions and therefore closer related to our main theme.
5structured non-monetary contributions to the well-being of club members (such as social
status) and monetary payoﬀs, which is in the center of our paper, is not a topic there.
Our paper builds on the idea of clubs as status organization being introduced by Hans-
mann (1986, 1996).5 Hansmann (1986), however, regards the formation of a club system
while we assume that clubs already exist. In contrast to Hansmann, we focus explicitly on
the strategic competition between two existing clubs and the decision making process be-
hind it.6 The papers most closely related to ours are, however, Epple/Romano (1998, 2002)
who analyze the competition among private and public schools for pupils in a world where
peer eﬀects make school quality dependent on the ability composition of a school’s student
body. Epple/Romano (1998) show that the competition of tax-ﬁnanced public schools and
proﬁt-maximizing private schools leads the latter to skim oﬀ the wealthiest and most able
students. We diﬀer signiﬁcantly by looking at competition among clubs that have similar
objective functions and where club decisions are determined by existing members rather than
a proﬁt-maximizing investor. Moreover, our focus is on the eﬀect of various decision making
rules within clubs on competition among them.
3 The Model
3.1 Status, utility and entry
We model two clubs which compete for a new candidate. The total population of old club
members consists of N + 1 ∈ N+ individuals which are distributed across the two clubs,
whereby N is assumed to be an odd number. Individuals are, with the exception of their
status position, identical. The status position describes their relative value for fellows in
social exchange processes and can be attributed to a wide set of characteristics such as
income, wealth, abilities, skills and network relations.
Status positions of old members are assumed to be uniformly distributed on a vertical
line ranging from s to ¯ s.7 The endpoints of the lines are populated by one individual each.
We rank individuals along the status line, i.e. a lower number ni of an individual indicates
a higher status position. The ﬁrst individual (with ni = 0) has the highest status level, ¯ s,
5Hansmann (1986, p.122) explains that “clubs” are a “prototypical example of status organizations”.
6Two other papers, which are rather closely related to the present one, are De Serpa (1977) and Baku
(1989). Both are related to the basic notion of clubs as social status organizations with, however, a focus that
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from ours. De Serpa (1977), by explicitly modelling the role of social interactions
in clubs, analyzes potential sources for ineﬃciency associated with club formation and competition. Baku’s
(1989) main focus is on an excess-demand equilibrium. He basically argues that if club members value social
status, it pays for a proﬁt-maximizing club owner to ration access to clubs in order to avoid dilution.
7We will discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption in section 7.
6whereas the individual at the other endpoint of the vertical line with ni = N has the lowest
status, s. All individuals with higher status positions are members of the more exclusive
club A, which has nA+1 members, whereas the remaining individuals (N −nA) are members
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Figure 1: Status distribution (for nA = 4 and N = 7)
A functioning club, which allows for active cooperation and social exchange among the
club members, requires ﬁnancial resources in order to cover operating costs, which are borne
by all club members.8 By means of cooperation and social exchange club members can
increase their well-being. This eﬀect hinges on the average social status of the other club
members, where status is a rival, non-tradeable good, meaning that each member dedicates
a ﬁxed amount of resources to supporting the aggregate of his fellows.9 Support follows a
random exchange among club members. Therefore, in expectation, each member gains an
equal share of a fellow’s support. Social exchange and/or cooperation is the more productive
and valuable the higher the social status of the counterpart. Hence, we depict the utility
function of a particular member k in club j as:
U
k
j = θˆ s
k
j − cj (1)
whereby ˆ sk
j denotes the average status of all the other members in club j from the point of
view of club member k, cj denotes the per-head operating cost of club j and θ ∈ (0,1] denotes
8We assume these operating costs to be so large that it is prohibitive for a subset of members (or new
candidates) to form a third club. Without this assumption we would shift our focus from competition of
clubs to club formation. The latter, though, has been already researched (e.g. by Hansmann (1986)) and is
not of our primary concern.
9This notion of the status variable is diﬀerent from status being equal to reputation, which is a non-rival
good.
7the relative preference of status versus money in the economy.10 Our linearity assumption
does not put any particular weight on either of the two arguments of the utility function,
besides θ: average status and monetary eﬀects (the membership fee) are perfect substitutes
(see, however, footnote 13) . The marginal rate of substitution between status and money
is constant for all players and hence independent of own status.
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nA+1 si − sk
N − nA − 1
(3)
with si denoting the status of the i − th member.
A candidate who is accepted as new member of the club11 aﬀects both arguments of the
utility function of the old club members. First, the new candidate changes the average status





i=0,i6=k si + sC
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nA+1 si − sk + sC
N − nA
. (5)
Second, with his entrance fee in club j, fj ≥ 0, the candidate contributes partially to covering
the ﬁnancial burden.12 We assume that the old members beneﬁt only partially from the new
entrant, i.e. the membership fee of the new entrant reduces the ﬁnancial burden of the
old members in club j by αfj. The fact that α < 1 depicts the notion that the services
of the club are not a purely public good but rather increase less than proportionally with
additional club members. Alternatively, we can interpret this as frictions in the transfer of
money between old and new club members which might be due to the fact that, for example,
10Subscripts denote clubs, superscripts denote individuals.
11As customary in many Tiebout type models, we assume all old members to be immobile because of
switching costs. The new candidates, however, are mobile and, hence, can choose to apply at any of the two
clubs. Candidates could be young researchers who have to relocate after obtaining a Ph.D. degree, while old
members are settled professors for whom switching clubs/faculties is prohibitively costly. We will discuss
this assumption in section 7.
12We assume that clubs face some budget constraint. fj ≥ 0 meets this assumption without loss of
generality. In the model interpretation where clubs actually pay entrants, e.g. young Ph.D. researchers, to
enter the club, fj = 0 characterizes the maximum salary a club can oﬀer and fj > 0 refers to lower salaries.
8the additional resources can only be consumed in the form of perks (better club services)
rather than as a reduction of membership fees.13
3.2 Majority voting in clubs
We start by focusing on the case in which majority voting in clubs prevails. Later on, we
will address other rules of decision making in the clubs as well. This implies that the median
club member is the one who actually determines the decisions of the club. The fact, that
the median along the status line is the median voter, stems from the strict monotonicity of
the utility gains from the new member. This characteristic can be shown as follows.14 The
utility diﬀerential (i.e. the utility after entry occurred minus the utility level before entry























which is strictly increasing in sC and the rank of k within the club. Therefore we obtain
Lemma 1 Old club members with lower status rank gain less (or lose more) from a candi-
date’s entry than members with higher status. The minimal status level of a new member
required by an individual old member k is lower, the higher the status rank of this old member.








Upon entry of any new member, this advantage is diluted. Hence, nA suﬀers more than
proportional from entry, which is expressed by (6). As for increasing N (or nA) this diﬀerence
diminishes, our analysis is best suited for smaller numbers of old members.
We model the competition among the two clubs for new entrants as a two-stage game.
In the ﬁrst stage, both clubs A and B simultaneously decide on the entrance fee demanded
by the new entrant, fj, and whether they are willing to allow the entrant to enter at all (i.e.
they choose a minimum status level, sj,min, for the entrant). In the second stage, the new
entrant chooses the club which provides him with the highest utility and accepts his entry.
In both stages of the game, complete information prevails. We solve this game by backward
induction for a subgame perfect solution.
13Moreover, the introduction of α relaxes our assumptions of status and money being perfect substitutes.
Any friction in the model that could be reached by assuming concave utility of status or convex operating
costs (with respect to the number of members of a club) can be reinterpreted with reference to α < 1 but
with signiﬁcantly less calculus.
14We derive this characteristic for club A only. The same procedure applies to club B and is straightforward.
94 Equilibria
4.1 The candidate’s decisions
In the ﬁnal stage of the game the entrant has to decide between two issues: Should he join




j − fj ≥ 0, (7)
with ˆ sC
j denoting the average status of the old members of club j from the perspective of the
new club member, C. We will refer to this inequality as the participation constraint of the
entrant in club j, (PCj). It implies that entry will take place if, and only if, the expected
gains from interaction with the other club members are not lower than the costs associated
with the entrance fee.
Given that the entrant will join any club at all, he will choose the one which oﬀers him
the highest net utility, meaning that he will prefer club j over club q if
θˆ s
C
j − fj > θˆ s
C
q − fq. (8)
If this inequality holds for the equality sign, we will call it the indiﬀerence condition (IC)
of the entrant. For matters of completeness we assume that, in this case, the candidate will
join club A. Using this and rearranging (8), we know that club A has to make sure that
fA = θ(ˆ s
C
A − ˆ s
C
B) + fB (9)
for being able to make an oﬀer that leads the candidate to prefer membership in club A over
club B. Assuming the anticipated behavior of the entrant, we will now address the optimal
behavior of the clubs.
4.2 The choices of the clubs
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, clubs A and B can perfectly predict the candidate’s behavior.
They compete by simultaneously choosing a tuple, (sj,min,fj),
The decision problem of the pivotal (median) member of club j is to maximize the
utility diﬀerential ∆
mj
j he will receive from entry of the candidate subject to the candidate’s
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nA+1 si − smB
N − nA − 1
(12)
Note that the second side constraint for club A may hold with equality.
As a ﬁrst step towards deriving the subgame perfect equilibrium we analyze the minimal
status requirements of the respective clubs as function of the entrance fees.
Therefore, we use the indiﬀerence condition, which club A has to make sure is holding,
and solve ∆
mj





























j is strictly increasing in sC, this implies that club j will not make any acceptable
oﬀer to candidates with sC < sj,min.
Comparing the minimum status position determined by the two clubs we ﬁnd:










The strict inequality sign holds by deﬁnition, i.e. due to the fact that the average status
of the more exclusive club A is higher than the one of club B. Thus, we can state:
Lemma 2 The more exclusive club A makes oﬀers to entrants with a relatively higher status
level. The required minimum status position of club B is strictly lower than the one of club
A (i.e. sA,min > sB,min∀fB).
Both sA,min and sB,min depend on fB. This makes fB a strategic tool in the hands of club
B: by reducing fB and thus raising sA,min, under certain circumstances club B can prevent
club A from making an oﬀer to the candidate that is attractive for both, the candidate and
club A.
15Henceforth, when writing sj,min we implicitly refer to sj,min(sk), where k is the pivotal old club member
in the speciﬁc decision making process.





































We prove in the appendix:
Proposition 1 The subgame-perfect equilibrium is characterized by actions depending on
the status of the candidate sC:
(i) Region IV: A candidate with very low status, sC < sB,min(fE
B), does not get an acceptable
oﬀer from either club.
(ii) Region III: A candidate with low status level, sC ∈ [sB,min(fE
B),sA,min(fE
B)), only gets an
acceptable oﬀer from club B, where fB = fE
B. He chooses to join club B but will not get any
surplus from entry.
(iii) Region II: A candidate with medium status level, sC ∈ [sA,min(fE
B),sA,min(fB = 0)),
receives acceptable oﬀers from both clubs, where fB = f
+
B < fE
B. He chooses to join club B
and gains strictly positive utility (increasing in sC).
(iv) Region I: A candidate with high status level, sC ∈ [sA,min(fB = 0), ¯ s] receives acceptable
oﬀers from both clubs. He joins club A. The entrance fee of ˜ fA leaves him a utility gain from
entry (constant in sC). The higher sC is the higher the gains of the club.
(v): The club losing the competition for the candidate in a region prices entry as competitive
as possible (such that ∆
mj
j = 0 for that club.)
Figures 2 (delineating the allocation of entrants to clubs) and 3 (plotting the fees paid
to the “winning” club) illustrate Proposition 1:
In region IV, it is obvious that candidates with very low status would not be willing to
pay an entrance fee that satisﬁes the median member mB (let alone mA). Hence Proposition
1.(i) follows. For candidates in region III, club B is protected from competition of club A
16The existence of region IV (and region III) described in Proposition 1 depends on assumption (15) to
hold for j = B (and j = A). If the exogenous eﬃciency exceeds that threshold, all candidates are accepted








No club; Region IV
Club B; Region III
Club B; Region II
Club A; Region I
Figure 2: Stratiﬁed segmentation of candidates in clubs A and B
since mA would only want to compete for the candidate if being remunerated extensively—
which would violate (PCA). This lets club B yield all surplus generated by entry of the
candidate. In region I, on the other hand, club A is protected from intense competition since
club B, because of its budget constraint, is not able to oﬀer high ranking candidates a level of
utility via the combination of old members’ average status and the entrance fee that exceeds
club A’s. As a consequence, club A yields some surplus. Because of part (v) of Proposition
1 club A cannot completely exploit the candidate, however, leaving some surplus generated
by entry with the candidate. In region II, competition for the candidate is most intense:
no club is protected from very competitive bids of the other club, which lets the candidate
enjoy a share of surplus generated from entry that increases in her own status.
The intuition of Proposition 1.(v) is that the “losing” club j neither has an incentive
to ask for a lower fee than the most competitive fee (this would violate sj,min and make
∆
mj
j < 0) nor to ask for a higher fee (this would make membership in club j even less
attractive for the candidate and would not change mj’s surplus of zero). Given this strategy




B and ˜ fA in the respective regions III to I.
For matters of completeness, note that in ﬁgure 3 we plotted equilibrium fees of the winning
club for ¯ s > N + 1 +
nA
2 .17
As a direct consequence of Proposition 1, we have:
Corollary 1 In equilibrium, there is no convergence of clubs with respect to status levels,
rather the diﬀerence in average status levels across clubs is perpetuated.
This is due to the fact that, generally speaking, the best candidates (with sC ≥ sA,min(fB =
17If that inequality did not hold, fE
B ≤ ˜ fA. f
+
B in region II would adjust accordingly starting from the
level of fE
B at sA,min(fE
B) and decreasing linearly to a value of zero at sA,min(fB = 0).
13sB,min(fE
B) sA,min(fE
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Figure 3: Entrance fees of the “winning” club
0)) join the best old members in club A, whereas lower ranking candidates join related old
members in club B, or even do not gain access to any club at all.18 Similarly, as a direct
consequence of Proposition 1 we have:
Corollary 2 The highest ranking new candidates (in region I) pay higher fees than some
candidates with relatively lower status (the best in region II).
In other words, top ranking scientists, for instance, according to our model, prefer to
join a top ranking faculty for comparatively low remuneration (= higher entrance fees),
and scientists with lower status join lower ranking faculties for a comparatively high salary.
Figure 3 visualizes this idea.
4.3 Diﬀerent preferences for status
Up to now our analysis used the assumption of a given relative preference for status. We will
relax this assumption now and ask about the implications for club competition if we consider
settings in which individuals value status relatively less. Or to put it diﬀerently: how does
the nature of club competition change if individuals value monetary transfer relatively more
than status?
For this purpose we alter θ in the equilibrium values for the borders of Proposition 1’s
regions and the winning bids. This gives us:
18Note that, if we allowed old club members to switch clubs after entry of the candidate occurred (which we
abstract from), Corollary 1 would still be valid: depending on parameters, either the lower status members of
club A, who gain least from entry due to Lemma 1, would switch to club B, or the highest ranking members
of club B would switch to club A (because lower ranking club B members would not be accepted in club A).
As a consequence, average status in club A would still be larger than average status in club B.
14Corollary 3 If preferences for status are lowered, this (i): has no impact on the minimal
status levels the two clubs demand and (ii): implies that the entrance fees in regions I-III
are reduced as long as sC 6= sA,min(fB = 0). With sC = sA,min(fB = 0) club A’s entrance fee
remains constant with a lower θ.
Proof: i) A glance on sB,min(fE
B), sA,min(fE
B), and sA,min(fB = 0) reveals that they do not
depend on θ.






∂θ > 0 and
∂ ˜ fA
∂θ > 0 for all sC 6=
sA,min(fB = 0).
The intuition behind this is the following. The minimal status levels are aﬀected twofold.
On the one hand, lower preferences for status diminish the entrant’s willingness to pay for
entering the club implying ceteris paribus that the clubs would become more restrictive. On
the other hand, however, the dilution eﬀect which accompanies the entrance of new members
becomes less important from the point of view of the old club members making them more
liberal with regard to the minimal status levels. Here, these two eﬀects just cancel.
The intuition for the second part of Corollary 3 is the consequence of our ﬁrst eﬀect:
with lower θs new club members value entry less. Therefore, the clubs can only charge
lower entrance fees. This also explains why Corollary 3.(ii) makes an exemption at sC =
sA,min(fB = 0), where the outside option of the candidate, fB, cannot be reduced further.
Hence, at that point the entrance fee, ˜ fA, does not have to be reduced, too.
5 Alternative Voting Schemes
In this section, we discuss three other voting schemes, meritocracy and unanimity with and
without side-payments.
5.1 Competition in the Presence of Unanimity Voting
Let us begin by looking at unanimity voting in the absence of any side payments (consensus
based voting). In this situation every old club member has a veto right. As a ﬁrst step
we have to ﬁnd the pivotal member in each club. The utility diﬀerential of the k-th old
member in a club via entry of a new member is strictly increasing in his own status rank (see
Equation (6). This implies that in club j the old member with the lowest status position is
decisive.
In contrast to our basic model, now, the member in club j with the lowest status position
(being located at nA in club A and at N in club B) solves the maximization problem (with
15mj replaced by nA or N in Eq. (11), respectively) yielding:
s
veto
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This allows us to derive the respective borders of the regimes as stated in Proposition 1.
Substituting fE





















In the same manner we ﬁnd:
s
veto
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This implies that fewer potential entrants will join either of the two clubs (since sveto
B,min >




B,min − sB,min = s
veto
A,min − sA,min, (21)
the ranges along the status line of new candidates actually joining club B move upwards
but have the same size as with competition under the majority voting rule.19 The result is
that regions II and III remain the same size, region I decreases, and region IV increases (see
Panel (iii) of Figure 4). This implies
Proposition 2 In comparison to the case with majority voting in both clubs, i) with compe-
tition based on unanimity in clubs A and B, both will apply more stringent selection rules. ii)
Less candidates join club A which decreases A’s total surplus. iii) The number of candidates
joining club B remains constant leaving B’s total surplus constant, too.
Figure 4, Panel (iii) illustrates this ﬁnding. The intuition for this is the following. Unanimity
implies that the old club member which gains least from the entrance of new club members
is decisive. For the old club member with the respective lowest status in the existing club,










N−nA = smB = ¯ s − mB = ¯ s − N+nA+1
2 .
16the dilution eﬀect is the largest. He has to share the existing high-status members with
somebody else and therefore will be more restrictive when it comes to opening the doors for
new members. This is true for both clubs. Hence, the minimal status requirements shift
up symmetrically implying that fewer entrants will be allowed to join altogether (region IV
shrinks) and has the consequence that fewer potential member can enter club A. Since the
shift is symmetric, this implies that club B “loses” member at the lower end of the status
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Figure 4: Unanimity and Majority Voting in the two Clubs
In addition to comparing majority voting with unanimity in both clubs we now brieﬂy
discuss a mixture of the two decision rules across club A and B. The technicalities are derived
in the appendix. Figure 4, Panels (i) and (ii) give a graphical overview of the results. We
distinguish between two cases. First, we consider the combination of unanimity in club A
and majority voting in B. Then, we reverse it.
In the ﬁrst case (unanimity in A, majority voting in B) matters are straightforward. Club
A becomes, relative to majority voting more restrictive while B’s optimal policy does not
change. Hence region I becomes smaller, allowing club B to attract more new members, not
only overall, but also in region II. This is due to the fact that the restrictiveness of club A
dampens competition, allowing club B to charge on average higher fees (i.e. push more of
its new members down to their participation constraint).
In the second case matters are somehow more diﬃcult. There, club A behaves as in our
main analysis while B becomes more restrictive. This leads to the question whether region
III, in which club B does not face any competition and therefore can charge fE
B, still exists.
The answer depends on the realization of α. For small enough α the competition pressures
17are less pronounced implying that region III survives. With a large enough α, in contrast,
competition leads to an elimination of region III. This is driven by the following trade-oﬀ:
First, as is obvious from comparing sA,min and sB,min ((13) and (14)), these are equal for
α = 1, i.e. if there is no friction between the candidate paying the entrance fee and the old
club members receiving it. The spread increases with growing distortion (1 − α) reﬂecting
the fact that, in this case, old club A members value status dilution comparatively higher
than monetary gains and, therefore, become more restrictive. This eﬀect is restricted to club
A because only this club has to satisfy the indiﬀerence condition which expresses the relative
value of status and fees for new members. Second, as shown above, a decisive old member
with lower status is more restrictive concerning new candidates’ acceptance than a member
with higher status. Hence, a change in club B’s control structure from the median to the
lowest ranking old member leads to a less liberal acceptance policy.
For α = α∗, these two eﬀects are equal. For α < α∗, the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates. Region
III shrinks but still exists, while regions II and I are unaﬀected. For α > α∗, the second
eﬀect dominates. No candidates will enter club B meaning that region III will disappear.
The same is valid for region II if club B sets fB = 0. For higher levels of fB the upper part
of region II (down to sA,min(fB > 0)) is served by club A. Region I remains constant. In
both cases, region IV grows larger.
5.2 Meritocracy
As mentioned in section 5, an obvious alternative decision design to voting by majority or
unanimity would be meritocracy, i.e. the old member of a club with the highest social status
would hold ﬁnal decision authority.
In club A, he is positioned at ni = 0. According to equation (6), member 0 relative to his
club fellows gains the most from a candidate’s membership and hence will accept relatively








A . This means that the extent to which club A becomes more restrictive by
changing from median to unanimity voting equals the extent to which it becomes more
liberal by moving from median voting to meritocracy. In line with this, using an analogous
argumentation as above, the regions where the candidate becomes a member of the club
increases. In this case, however, an increase of Region I decreases the aggregate surplus
of club A because pivotal member 0 oﬀers candidates to enter the club for a fee that only
makes sure his own utility diﬀerential from entry is non-negative. ∆i
A of his fellows, however,
will be negative for most of them if sC ∈ [smerit
A,min(fB = 0),sA,min(fB = 0)). In turn, it are
exactly these candidates who have a net gain from the change in club A’s decision making
rule because they voluntarily join that club and were restricted to club B membership before.
The argumentation for club B is analogous. We can state:
18Proposition 3 (i) Changing from majority voting to meritocracy implies that the club mem-
ber with the highest status level becomes the decision maker, which lets the club adopt a more
liberal entry policy. (ii) This leads to a decrease of the club’s surplus.
5.3 Unanimity with side-payments (compensation)
A seemingly more sophisticated version of voting by unanimity is to maximize the joint
utility diﬀerential of a club’s old members and to allow those individual members gaining
from the decision to share proﬁts with less fortunate fellows.






A . Thus, sA,min under this regime would equal sA,min under majority
voting. Since determination of sA,min is the main driver for the remaining results, using a
compensatory scheme is not diﬀerent from using “regular” majority voting. Therefore, we
refrain from discussing it in more detail.
6 Welfare
Which implications does our model entail for a social planner who strives to maximize total













C − (1 − α)fj (22)
If the candidate joins neither club, the net gain is zero. (22) captures a trade-oﬀ: since
the candidate cannot make use of his status if he is left without club membership, his entry
creates value worth θsC. On the other hand, without entry the candidate derives utility fj
from his monetary resources. Entry shifts this sum to the old members of a club and reduces
its value by the ineﬃciency factor (1 − α). It is obvious that, for any given status of the
candidate sC, a ﬁrst-best allocation is reached by requiring an entrance fee of fj = 0 and
granting the candidate access to an arbitrary club. The latter reﬂects the fact that, from
the point of view of the old members, it is more eﬃcient to allocate the new entrant to club
B,20 whereas the new entrant prefers joining club A. In total, the two eﬀects just balance.
An alternative, somehow more realistic benchmark is a second-best allocation, in which
the constrained social planner aims to maximize welfare while taking the entry conditions
and fees as given. To obtain the second-best benchmark, let us note that ∆TS, as deﬁned in
(22), strictly increases in sC. Using this and setting (22) equal to zero shows that the social
20This is due to the fact that old members in club B, on average, gain relatively more from an entrant
with high status and lose relatively less from an entrant with low status than old members in club A.
19planner prefers in a second-best (SB) world that all candidates characterized by sC ≥ sSB,min





To compare the second-best with the equilibria derived above, recall that, according to
Proposition 1, all candidates in regions I-III will gain access to a club, while candidates
in region IV will be excluded from entry. Under majority voting, the marginal candidate










B . Inserting fE
B in (23) reveals that, under majority voting, market-based com-
petition among clubs leads to a second-best result, i.e. sB,min(fE
B) = sSB,min(fE
B).
At the second-best entry-threshold, where sC = sB,min(fE
B), the candidate enters club B.
Therefore, by deﬁnition, each club A member gains ∆i
A = 0, the candidate is completely
exploited and the pivotal (median) member in club B also yields zero incremental net utility.
This implies (see Eq. (6) and Lemma 1) that old club B members with status levels below
smB will suﬀer from the candidate’s entry. Because of our linearity assumption of the status
distribution, however, their aggregate loss is exactly oﬀset by the net gain of old club B
members with status levels above the median (for them ∆i
B > 0).
When club B changes from majority voting to unanimity, its pivotal member switches
from mB to N. As the pivotal member will make sure to get at least a net gain of zero, he
will grant access to less candidates than the median member (cf. Eq. (20)) thereby excluding
ineﬃciently many candidates from club membership.
Analogously, when club B switches from majority voting to meritocracy, i.e. the highest




B). As a consequence, all other club B members (with si < snA+1)





Proposition 4 (i) Market-based competition among clubs never leads to the ﬁrst-best allo-
cation.
(ii) Under majority voting in club B, market-based competition among clubs leads to a second-
best result, i.e. sB,min(fE
B) = sSB,min(fE
B).
(iii) Under unanimity voting in club B, market-based competition among clubs leads to




(iv) If club B employs the meritocracy regime, market-based competition among clubs leads




20Proposition 4.(i) is due to the fact that in equilibrium there does not exist a positive sC
where fj = 0. sC = sA,min(fB = 0) −  comes close, but still a positive fee  has to be paid
from the entrant to club B.
7 Discussion
We will focus in this section on what we consider the driving assumptions of our set-up and
its conclusions.
The main mechanism in our analysis hinges on the fact that club members with higher
status gain relatively more from a new member than old members with a lower status.
Technically, this stems from the fact that club members beneﬁt from the average status of
their fellow members (excluding their own) independent of the speciﬁc form of the utility
function. The fact that old members with lower status gain less than old members with
higher status depicts the fact that, in case of entry, they have to share the possibility to
interact with higher status members with more fellows. In contrast, high status members
gain relatively less from social interaction anyway. They beneﬁt more from club facilities
etc., i.e. from the monetary contribution of the new member. Given that we consider clubs
as status organizations, in which social interaction matters and in which social status is
vertically diﬀerentiated, this is a quite natural and general mechanism.
To illustrate this, consider the following extreme example: a club consisting of a high
and a low status member. The former communicates with the latter and gains rather little
from social interaction whereas the low status member experiences signiﬁcant gains. If a
new member with an intermediate status level enters, the high status member even gains in
absolute terms whereas the low status member suﬀers from a dilution eﬀect. Obviously, this
eﬀect is most prevalent with a rather small number of club members and more and more
disappears if club sizes increase. Therefore, we consider our main mechanism to be robust
as long as we do not study clubs that are very large and as long as we accept the notion of
status being a vertically diﬀerentiated value.
We consider in the main body of our analysis a one-shot game (entry takes place only
once). Corollary 1 states our divergence result. What happens if we extent this one-shot
game to a repeated game setting? If new entrants are stochastically distributed along the
status line, the position of the median-voter in the two clubs remains the same over time.
That is, the resulting equilibrium in every stage game is not changed, diﬀerences in status
levels are perpetuated in every stage. There are two remaining issues in this respect. First,
in a repeated game setting, the median-voter might foresee the impact his decision has on the
subsequent stages. Letting a low status candidate enter now implies that the median-voter
in the subsequent stage game is more restrictive. Hence, the present median-voter has an
incentive to be marginally more liberal. But this eﬀect turns in the opposite direction if the
21low status candidate is actually permitted. Therefore, we expect that in total the eﬀect is
negligible. Second, new entrants lead to an even number of club members. The resulting
problem for the median-voter model could just be solved with a random choice mechanism
leading on average to the same eﬀect.
A third issue that we think is worth a broader discussion is our assumption of α being
smaller than one. For our positive analysis, this assumption is analogous to assuming the
utility function being concave in monetary transfers. Therefore, and because we do not
think that club services are adequately modelled as public goods, we consider the ineﬃ-
ciency parameter (1 − α) as a reasonable description. With monetary transfers and status
being perfectly exchangeable (α = 1), new entrants could (and would be willing to) perfectly
compensate their lack of status by simply paying more fees. Consequently, club A would
attract all potential new entrants (sA,min = sB,min). This extreme result, which is an imme-
diate of the symmetry of the utility functions of all old members (see below) and the perfect
exchangeability between status and monetary transfers, is avoided with α < 1.
Finally, let us discuss the symmetry of the utility functions of all agents (existing members
of both clubs as well as the candidate), which our results crucially depend on. Most notably,
θ is identical across all agents. This implies that the marginal rate of substitution between
status and monetary transfers is identical for all agents. A relaxation of this assumption
has potentially strong, but in most cases quite obvious implications. The most interesting
application is when the new candidate has a lower θ than the old club members, i.e. the
new candidate values status less than money. In this case, the competitive advantage of club
A decreases. The diﬀerence in fees becomes more important. This becomes most obvious
with θ = 0. Then only fees are relevant for the new candidate. At the same time, a new
entrant with high status is relatively more attractive for club B than for club A (since the
eﬀect on average status is more pronounced for club B). Hence, with a low θ club B is able
and willing to attract high status candidates leading to convergence of clubs. A potentially
relevant application of this is when highly reputable professors prefer second-tier universities
(making much more money there) than joining a top-university. Since there are no obvious
justiﬁcations of systematic diﬀerences in preferences, we stick to our symmetry assumption
in the main body of the analysis.
8 Empirical Implications and Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the development of already existing member-owned clubs
and their competition for new members. Our model applies to a wide range of potential appli-
cations beyond our particular example of academic institutions. The deﬁning characteristics
are that the clubs under consideration are member-owned clubs (i.e. the old members pos-
sess the decision rights) and that members’ utility depends on the status positions of the
22other members. Finally, some sort of membership fees should play a role in the admission
process of new members. Against this background, it is quite obvious that our analysis
applies not only to academic institutions but also to other clubs with a vertically structured
status variable such as country clubs, internet clubs, conference organizations etc. In con-
trast, our model cannot be applied without adaptations to clubs with a multi-dimensional
status variable, where members’ preferences are not single-peaked.21
The main hypotheses emerging from our theoretical analysis, which are empirically
testable, are the following. Our model predicts:
1. The best candidates entering the system should end up in the best clubs/institutions
(see Corollary 1)
2. However, they should accept lower salaries than second-tier candidates who join lower
ranking clubs (see Corollary 2).
3. If a club’s decision making process is switched from unanimous voting to majority vot-
ing, its acceptance policy with respect to new candidates should become more liberal,
meaning that the marginal status requirement for candidates to get a membership of-
fer should decrease. By switching to meritocracy we expect this process even to be
accelerated (see Lemma 1 and Propositions 2.(i) and 3.(i)).
4. As clubs proﬁt, on a cooperative basis, from avoiding extreme decision making rules
such as the unanimity or meritocracy rules, we should expect to observe trends towards
majority voting. Since, for instance, many academic faculties in Europe are organized
in a consensus-based way, we expect them to liberalize their decision-making processes
over time (see Propositions 2.(ii) and 3.(ii)). This would be welfare enhancing (see
Proposition 4.(ii)).
There are a number of potential avenues for extensions: analyzing the implications of
competition of investor-owned clubs (such as some professional sports clubs) would be a
straightforward and particularly interesting one. As a ﬁrst step in this direction it would be
crucial to deﬁne the objective function of such an organization.
21Current NATO members, for instance, when considering entry of new states into their club, could either
have a preference for military power or for a certain geographical location of candidate states (e.g. being
situated in Eastern Europe to serve as potential buﬀer against Russia). Old members’ preferences could
be horizontally diﬀerentiated in both dimensions, hence a unique ranking of potential candidates (and old
members alike) along the status line would be impossible.
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25A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
(i): Because of Lemma 2, the cut-oﬀ status level below which candidates do not get an
acceptable oﬀer from any club is determined by club B. fE
B denotes the entrance fee for
which (PCB) of the entrant just holds with equality. Since sB,min is decreasing in fB,
sB,min(fE
B) is the lowest status level where club B makes an oﬀer that meets (PCB).
(ii): By deﬁnition of sA,min, in the range sC ∈ [sB,min(fE
B),sA,min(fE
B)) club A is not able
to make a membership oﬀer to the candidate, which satisﬁes both parties (independently
of club B’s behavior). Therefore, club B is able to exploit the candidate completely, which
means to set fB = fE
B.
(iii): For sC ≥ sA,min(fE
B), demanding fB = fE
B has the consequence that club A has an
incentive to match the oﬀer of club B. The candidate would then join club A. In the range
sC ∈ [sA,min(fE
B),sA,min(fB = 0)), however, club B can use the incremental reduction of fB
as a strategic tool and make sure that sA,min(fB) > sC > sB,min(fB). Thus, club A has no
incentive to oﬀer the candidate entry for a fee that would both meet (PCA) and make him
prefer membership in club A over club B. Because of the second part of this inequality, club
B still has this incentive, though. As a reduction in the entrance fee reduces sA,min and
sB,min by the same factor, α
θ (see (13) and (14)), B can sustain this behavior in the entire
region II. By using (13) we can ﬁnd f
+
B as deﬁned above, whereby  denotes a very small
number and (∂f
+
B)/(∂sC) < 0. Hence, an entrant with sC very close to sA,min(fB = 0) does
have to pay almost no entrance fee and, consequently, realizes the highest possible utility
increase of candidates ﬁnally joining club B.
(iv): Because of the budget constraint of club B, fB cannot be lowered below zero. Hence,
club B has no tool to prevent club A from making candidates with sC ≥ sA,min(fB = 0) an
oﬀer that beneﬁts both of them, i.e. club A could let the indiﬀerence condition (and the
participation constraint) of the candidate hold. Comparing (7) and (9) reveals that, from
the point of view of club A, (9) is always more restrictive. This implies that, if club A sets
an entrance fee for which the indiﬀerence condition holds, the participation constraint is
always fulﬁlled. Thus, club A demands an entrance fee which is equal to the diﬀerence of the
average status levels of the two clubs from the point of view of the entrant, which produces
fA = ˜ fA. Since this expression is independent of sC, the entrance fee is the same for all
entrants into club A implying the same utility gain for all of them. As ∆
mA
A increases in sC,
however, the median of club A gains more the higher sC is.
(v): The club losing the competition for the candidate (both clubs in region IV, club A in
regions III and II, club B in region I) gets a surplus of zero, no matter which (rational)
strategy it employs. If it plays the most competitive strategy and asks for a (sj,min,fj)-
26combination such that ∆
mj
j = 0, it still has no incentives to deviate. However, it ensures
that the actions explained in parts (i)-(iv) are actually incentive-compatible, i.e. part of the
equilibrium strategy of the winning club, because then all constraints mentioned there have
to bind strictly. Otherwise, the “winning” club would lose. 
A.2 Unanimity in Club A and Majority Voting in Club B
In this case sB,min, that is the same minimum status requirement of club B as in our bench-
mark case, applies. However, due to sveto
A,min > sA,min club A employs a more restrictive
entrance policy, implying that the borders of regions I and II shift upward. The distance
between the two boundaries remains the same. However, since fB enters linearly into sveto
A,min
(see (16)), region II remains of the same size but shifts upwards. For any given sC, since club
A has become even more exclusive in its selection process, club B can charge higher entrance
fees, f∗
B, for sC ∈ [sveto
A,min(fE
B),sveto
A,min(fB = 0)). Since sveto
A,min(fB = 0) > sA,min(fB = 0),
region I shrinks, implying that fewer potential members actually join club A. Due to the fact
that the critical status level, below which club B is not willing to oﬀer aﬃliation to potential
new members, remains the same, region IV stays the same, whereas we observe an expansion
of region III.
A.3 Unanimity in Club B and Majority Voting in Club A
We now reverse the decision rules which apply in the two clubs: majority voting in the more
exclusive club A and unanimity in club B. In this case the behavior of club A is just the
same as in our benchmark analysis. Club B’s decisions are determined by the club member
with the lowest status (being located at N).
We ﬁnd by comparing (14) and (17):
s
veto
B,min − sB,min > 0 (25)
In comparison to majority voting, unanimity leads to more stringent selection procedures.
Club B will increase the threshold level for potential entrants’ status requirement. Therefore,
region IV increases, whereas region III shrinks. Region I remains the same as with majority
voting in both clubs. The open question is, however, whether the latter disappears completely
and, more generally, whether club B is able and willing to take in any new candidates at all,
that is, whether regions II and III still exist.
If sveto
B,min > sA,min, all new candidates that club B is interested in, will also receive a
membership oﬀer by club A—and, while letting the indiﬀerence condition hold, club A will
attract the candidate. Then, club B would receive no new members meaning that regions II
27and III would disappear. sveto
B,min > sA,min equals:
PN
nA+1 si − sN















Since the sum of the ﬁrst two terms is strictly negative, the LHS is negative for α = 0. In










sN) which is positive, given the uniform distribution of status positions. Since the LHS is
continuous and strictly increasing in α, a unique α∗ exists so that for all α > α∗, sveto
B,min >
sA,min.
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